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In the face of the dire conditions of today’s global order, for those aiming to transform this 
reality in the spirit of a just, equal, and ecologically healthy existence for all of humanity and 
nature, it is time for the political exercise of the transformative utopian impulse. Yet, in the face 
of such utopian praxis, capitalism’s retrieval mechanism “subsumes and consumes” (Mark 
Fisher) the radical potential of utopianism. A key component of this apparatus can be seen in the 
contemporary upsurge of “dystopian” expression (especially in literature, film, and television). 
While this indulgent cooptation flourishes on the dark side of the neoliberal street, a concomitant 
enclosure of “eutopian” sensibility further restricts utopia’s anticipatory impulse by managed 
innovations that shrink this energy into a resigned “dystopian” structure of feeling as the radical 
utopian project itself is compromised through practices of disciplined improvement within the 
declared “realism” of the existing order. In this essay (writing as a utopian, and especially a 
teacher, and in the spirt of collegial utopian discourse), I discuss two symptomatic texts which I 
argue are imbricated within this dystopian ambience by way of a critique that enables me to 
examine such works as they play out within this current sociocultural order. On one hand, and 
with great respect for its internationally-recognized author, I read the text of Dystopia: A Natural 
History, by Gregory Claeys, as a (however unintended) component of this hegemonic structure 
of feeling rather than a challenge to it. On the other hand, I read Kim Stanley Robinson’s 
“Dystopia Now” as a negation of that negation, as the sf author and public intellectual takes up 
an anti-anti-utopian stance that refuses the containment field of a “seemingly omnipresent reality 
principle” that informs today’s “fashionable pessimism, or simply cynicism” and reasserts the 
radical utopian project (Robinson).  
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Dystopias matter because they make us think. They help us to imagine and 
envisage how the present can change into something very nasty.…. Dystopias 
thus interrogate the now and offer warnings and sometimes prophecies about the 
future; they are often the jeremiads of utopianism. But sometimes they offer 




One way of being anti-anti-utopian is to be utopian. It’s crucial to keep imagining 
that things could get better, and furthermore to imagine how they might get better. 
…. So by force of will or the sheer default of emergency we make ourselves have 
utopian thoughts and ideas. This is the necessary next step following the 
dystopian moment, without which dystopia is stuck at a level of political quietism 
that can make it just another tool of control and of things-as-they-are. (online) 




The current global order threatens humanity and all of nature. Harm abounds everywhere. 
Economically, the world-wide incursion of neoliberal capitalism produces alienation and 
exploitation in all aspects of everyday life. Politically, the overdetermined array of corporate 
power, superpower aggression, and the failure of democratic politics to uphold the utopian 
potential of justice and peace increases the privileges of the rich and powerful and unevenly 
subjects people around the world to lives of intensifying vulnerability and immiseration. 
Culturally and existentially, accelerated by these social depredations, virulent hatred feeds a 
spreading wave of xenophobia (attacking on grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, or 
any other mode of perceived difference that appears to threaten an already vulnerable populace). 
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And, environmentally, with the downward spiral of climate catastrophe, planetary life is facing 
total destruction.
3
 In the face of these dire conditions, for those of us (in our diverse 
intersectional situations) who aim to transform this current reality in the spirit of a just, equal, 
and healthy existence for all of humanity and nature, it is clearly time for the political exercise of 
the hopeful, transformative utopian impulse. Yet, even as we engage the utopian problematic and 
praxis, we need to recognize the ways in which capitalism’s retrieval mechanism “subsumes and 
consumes” the radical potential of utopianism.
4
   
An effective component of this apparatus of enclosure and erasure can be seen in the 
contemporary upsurge of “dystopian” expression (especially in literature, film, and television). 
This output of dark narratives has congealed in a “dystopia porn” (as sf writer Vandana Singh 
puts it) that suppresses humanity’s social anxieties through a fatalist, anti-utopian inoculation 
that normalizes pessimistic indulgence in this terrifying reality at the expense of energizing the 
utopian prophetic challenge of which the dystopian imagination is capable.
5
  Consequently, this 
popular structure of feeling immerses people in nihilist pleasure that opportunistically feeds back 
into the dark experience of our present and sustains a disarming anti-utopian pessimism.
6
 As 
Franco Berardi observes, a “mutation” has occurred in the collective cultural imagination that 
generates a sense of “impotence” that leads us “to think that our own suffering cannot be relieved 
by political projects” (Berardi 43, 44).
7
 Assessing the The Hunger Games film, Berardi argues 
that such a dystopian portrayal no longer stimulates anger and rebellion but rather delivers the 
message that the world portrayed is the world that is given, and only survivable by competing on 
its terms: “In this new world, only the winner can survive, and if one wants to win she must 
eliminate all the others, friends and foes” (Berardi 45).  
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While this compliant erasure of utopian hope flourishes on the dark side of the neoliberal 
street, a concomitant subsumption of utopian sensibility within the operating conditions of the 
present is also restricting transformative desire through managed innovations limited to the terms 
and conditions of social life as people already know it. The radical utopian project is being 
coopted and compromised, as Darren Webb argues, by way of combined practices of immersed 
resignation and disciplined improvement according to the declared “realism” of the existing 
order.
8
 Against this toxic resignation and complicity, what is needed is not a one-dimensional 
black mirror that reflects in on itself but rather a prismatic utopian beam that shines through this 
provincial temporality and opens people to new possibilities out of which critical and 
transformative visions and practices can emerge. If we choose to change these oppressive 
maneuvers then it’s time to throw off the veil of dystopian despair and exercise what Rebecca 
Solnit describes as “hope in the dark” and embrace what Sara Ahmed describes as “acts of 




In the June 2017 The New Yorker, Jill Lepore addressed this resigned structure of feeling 
in “A Golden Age for Dystopian Fiction.”
10
 After reviewing current titles in the “new literature 
of radical pessimism,” she concluded that this “blighted crop of dystopian novels is pessimistic 
about technology, about the economy, about politics, and about the planet, making it a more 
abundant harvest of unhappiness than most other heydays of downheartedness” (online). Like 
Berardi, she expressed her fear that the progressive reading effect of the dystopian form has been 
stymied.  As she put it: dystopia “used to be a fiction of resistance; [now] it’s become a fiction of 
submission …. It cannot imagine a better future, and it doesn’t ask anyone to bother to make one. 
It nurses grievances and indulgences resentments; and it doesn’t call for courage; it finds that 
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cowardice suffices. It’s only admonition is: Despair more” (online). What is lacking in this dark 
context, she implied, is hopeful, transformative desire that counters the “dismal trend” of an 
“unremitting dystopianism”; for without this counterpoint, humanity is doomed. Thus, Lepore 
concluded: “a story about ruin can be beautiful. Wreckage is romantic. But the politics of ruin is 
doomed” (online).  
In the review, Lepore referred to a recent scholarly work that resonates with this 
sociocultural zeitgeist. While she identified Dystopia: A Natural History, by Gregory Claeys, as 
a “shrewd new study” of dystopian writing, she found in its pages little theoretical or 
methodological support for her argument against the culture and politics of ruin and resignation. 
Yet, there is no doubt that DANH (written by an internationally-recognized scholar who has 
made a substantial contribution to utopian studies) stands as a timely and formidable disquisition 
on the nature and significance of dystopia.
11
 Given the previous output of its author, the prestige 
of its Oxford imprint, and the broad scope of its subject matter, the book has attracted the 
attention of utopian scholars and students. It is this very reception that prompts me (as a utopian 
colleague, and especially a teacher) to consider the role it might play in reinforcing or 
challenging the sociopolitical ambience of the present moment. Certainly, DANH is not a book to 
be ignored, not in these days haunted by dystopian despair and crying for utopian hope. 
However, based on my critical assessment, I can understand why Lepore was unable to find 
inspiration in this substantial volume. With respect for the author and his lifetime project of 
elucidating the history of utopianism, and in the spirit of utopian critique and not dismissal, I find 
that the text of DANH unfortunately emerges as a disciplinary contribution to the current 






Based in extensive research, DANH develops a unique analysis of the “concept” of 
dystopia. In presenting this phenomenon as it “increasingly defines the spirit of our times,” the 
book’s three Parts proceed by way of rich historical detail but then coalesce into a universalizing 
ontology. Part I addresses the “political dystopia” and the “origin of dystopian space” through 
anthropological and psychological readings of early human behavior as it confronted 
“monstrosity” and “intensely evil spaces”; Part II links dystopia with “totalitarianism” in a 
review running from Jacobinism to the Pol Pot regime and ends with condemnations of the 
“intrusion of utopia into politics” and collective revolutionary action; and Part III offers a literary 
survey of dystopia (“born as a reaction to popular revolutionism” and the “extremes of utopian 
ambition”) based in a content analysis of texts running from an originary point in eighteenth-
century British satire to “post-totalitarian” texts that dwell on the “death of nature” and the 
“conclusion of the artificial and mechanical history of mankind” (57, 263, 498). 
 In order to situate my examination of this significant volume, I want to refer to two 
previous contributions by the book’s author that can help elucidate the methodological and 
theoretical framework of DANH. First, in “The Five Languages of Utopia: Their Respective 
Advantages and Deficiencies, with a Plea for Prioritising Social Realism,” readers are presented 
with an assessment of several approaches that analyze “the subject of utopia” (10).
13
 Naming the 
five “languages” as “literature, religion, progress, psychology and history” (an uneven set of 
categories which nevertheless bespeaks the multi-layered, transdisciplinary project of utopian 
studies), the essay argues that, taken together, these modes of “perception” constitute not a 
vibrant combinatoire (my term) but rather a “babel of contending tongues in which much is lost 
in translation”; and it therefore suggests that they should be “reconstituted and prioritized” in 
order to convey a “clearer sense” of the subject of utopia (“Five Languages” 10, my emphasis). 
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As each “language” is reviewed, popular assumptions associated with utopianism are questioned: 
that utopia is exclusively a literary category, an account of perfect societies, a psychological 
impulse or principle, or a synonym for social improvement; and underlying all this is a 
“dismissal” of the “common language definition of utopia as ‘impossible’” (“Five Languages 9, 
see 10-11).  
Within this disciplinary gatekeeping, the essay offers valuable observations (i.e., 
affirming the range of utopian manifestations, refusing the ascription of perfection); but it then 
demotes key matters concerning utopianism (its power as psychological impulse, its function as a 
mechanism for social improvement, its imbrication with the science fiction genre, and its 
relationship with categories of the possible and impossible) that are deeply embedded in 
approaches such as Marxist hermeneutics, feminist and queer criticism, critical ethnographic 
studies, literary and cultural studies, and theological and postsecular hermeneutics, to name a 
few). Having implicitly “reconstituted” such modes of interrogation in a manner that reduces 
their potential contribution, the essay nominates the “historical” language of “social realism” as 
the one most capable of doing justice to utopian studies. In doing so (while never quite defining 
what is meant by “social” or “realism”), the essay valorizes a singular approach that claims the 
legitimacy of an empirical, positivist paradigm (rather than working with any of the historical 
and hermeneutic approaches represented above). Therefore, this selected approach endorses 
those analyses that are aligned with a politics of the possible as it exists in the perceivable 
conditions of the present moment. As a result, the proffered approach lacks a deeper 
consideration of the complex and uneven spatiotemporal conditions of a given historical era in 
which untapped or undeveloped progressive, utopian, potentialities are available but rendered 
“impossible” to achieve by the prevailing system. Further limiting the scope of this 
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methodology, the essay discounts the productive value of interpretive paradigms that can address 
utopian affect, expression, form, practice, or temporality in ways that can adduce the range of 
transgressive and transformative utopian possibilities that can operate within existing trace 
conditions of perceived (im)possibility. 
With this rectification, this disciplinary (in academic and Foucauldian senses) 
intervention diminishes the utopian impulse by stripping it of its multi-temporal, multi-spatial, 
multi-cultural, micro-macro energies and reduces it to the pragmatic task of realizing a restricted 
utopian program governed by “an understanding of real social relations in a realistic 
reorganization of society which utilizes institutional and legal means to enforce greater equality 
and sociability” (“Five Languages 12).
14
 Following work by Thomas More, B. F. Skinner, and J. 
C. Davis, the essay contains and controls the power of the utopian impulse by means of a 
“historical discourse” that reaffirms the program of an “ideal commonwealth or at best city-
state” that respects “the restraint and control of behavior” and “portrays a system of enhanced 
sociability (and often suppressed individuality) in which institutionally-enforced communalism 
mitigates the effects of excessive social inequality” – although it is never made evident just who 
that social order serves, nor who or what should be controlled, nor how its aspirations should be 
“enforced” (“Five Languages 14). “Five Languages” thus establishes a social realist approach at 
the summit of a hierarchical adjudication that subordinates, and implicitly weakens, the other 
approaches within the strictures of an apparently objective realism (“Five Languages 14). By 
undervaluing the importance of the utopian impulse and stepping back from historically-
contextualized interpretive engagements with cultural production (including utopian/dystopian 
form), a minimalist concept of utopia/dystopia overrides the complex dynamic of a utopian 
problematic and process that could radically challenge established social reality. The essay 
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therefore makes the universalizing claim that the “realistic definition of utopia permits us to 
reappropriate the concept as a mode of conceiving a realizable future” (“Five Languages 15). 
Within this disciplinary enclosure of impulse by program, the essay evinces a preference for a 
restricted, indeed mandarin, version of utopia that “remains a defensible concept, provided we 
limit it sufficiently” (“Five Languages” 15).  
Returning to DANH, this assertion of a theoretically and politically domesticated theory 
and practice of a controlling utopianism limited to its function within the present moment is 
reinforced by the authority conveyed through the publisher’s back cover promotional copy that 
declares it to be the “first monograph devoted to the concept.” In the essay and the book, the 
implication is that no other approach, or combination of approaches, to utopia or dystopia is as 
capable of productively articulating the ideal utopian program. From this perspective, there is 
one preferred way to address utopianism: namely, via empirical analysis contained within the 
surface conditions of a confined present that has no residual past to learn from and no emergent 
future to anticipate (498). Yet, as a quick literature search demonstrates, at least since 1990 there 
have been several works that address the question of dystopia in more complex ways: such as, 
Raffaella Baccolini, “Breaking the Boundaries: Gender, Genre, and Dystopia," in Per una 
definizione dell’utopia: Metodologie e discipline a confronto (1992); M. Keith Booker, The 
Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature: Fiction as Social Criticism (1994); Lyman Tower 
Sargent, “Three Faces of Utopia Revisited” (1994); Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan, eds., 
Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian Imagination (2003); and Tom Moylan, 
Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia (2000). While most of these are 
mentioned in DANH, the book does not substantively engage with them. Considered  from the 
standpoint of DANH, this deflection makes internal sense; for historical-hermeneutic studies such 
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as these adduce a radically holistic cultural and political, utopian and dystopian, engagement 
with a depth of impulse and complexity of program – and are less prescriptive yet more open to 
what is actually at stake in concrete sociocultural production.  
 Second, given this prioritized approach to utopianism (and dystopia) and its consequent 
devaluation of utopia, a revealing comment in another source casts further light on the nature of 
the philosophical, political, and methodological paradigm that informs DANH. In the author’s 
short insertion of his own comments in the jointly-written (with Lyman Tower Sargent) 
“Introduction” to the 2017 edition of the Utopia Reader, the textual segment rejects no less than 
the grounding principle that drives the utopian impulse: Hope.
15
 In this dismissal, the extensive 
theoretical work on utopianism and hope – especially by Ernst Bloch but also by Fredric 
Jameson, Ruth Levitas, and others – is elided.
16
 Instead, this intervention asserts that the 
“suggestion that ‘hope’ is a quality to be prioritized in texts, and should be linked to preferring 
‘authentic’ utopian experience over other forms, implies a questionable moral essentialism” 
(“Introduction” 4). Against this claim, a close reading of the diverse commentaries of hope 
would indicate that interpretive utopian studies (with its hermeneutics of suspicion and 
anticipation) do not reify hope or lock it into a fixed constellation of meaning or practice, nor 
make it the driving engine of a moral essentialism. Rather, in varying ways, they regard it as a 
palpably material element of concrete human behavior. Indeed, the more common understanding 
is that human proclivities of utopian impulse and hope emerge in overdetermined ways within 
historical contingency, often in contradiction or conflict. In this regard, the negation of thinking 
or practice that becomes trapped in essentialist programs or fixed teleologies is just what the 
original deployment of the critical utopia in its (too often overstated) critique of blueprints aimed 
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for as it generated the negation of that negation in a hopeful utopian project that unfolds in a self-
critical, self-correcting, as historically located process.  
 Based on my reading of these two sources and of DANH, I regrettably conclude that the 
book’s approach to utopianism leads to the employment of a one-dimensional dystopian 
discourse to challenge “dystopian” reality and ends up as an epistemologically circular maneuver 
that strategically discharges the power of the utopian impulse to transgress and transform present 
conditions. Consequently, it proffers a weak utopianism that is, however unintentionally, drawn 
into the gravitational force of the anti-utopian tradition, especially as it sustains contemporary 
neoliberal culture. As such, and against progressive political positions previously expressed by 
its author, this specific project evinces a political standpoint that remains caught within the 
popular dystopian structure of feeling and fundamentally disarms utopia, even as it aims to stand 
against the current order of things. Given this overall stance which holds that utopian responses 
are significant only when realistic enough to be an engine for a controlled social change, DANH 
leaves little room for an oppositional imaginary that could anticipate radical holistic alternatives.  
The overarching narrative that feeds this assertion begins with the book’s identification of 
dystopia as a “natural” phenomenon emerging in the primal forge of the human encounter with 
evil and then moves into discussions of totalitarianism and literary dystopia in a manner that 
traps dystopian representation in tales of institutional social terror, on one hand, and natural and 
social destruction, on the other. Within this framework driven by the practice of origin studies 
but deriving from an underlying metaphysical base, the unfolding argument collapses the 
relationship between sign and signifier and regards dystopia as a unitary referent in prehistory 
and modernity before turning to a summary account of its literary “diffractions” (as a subtitle 
puts it). This “natural history” proceeds according to a narrative based in an ideological binary of 
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good and evil which is applied to the formation of early humans responding to an everyday 
world of natural and social horrors with minimal hope for amelioration in the face of cosmic and 
existential darkness. Revealingly, DANH never mentions anthropological paradigms that deliver 
more benign interpretations of human sociality as it developed in ecological compatibility with 
the rest of nature. Thus, the text disregards the cultural and spiritual experience of indigenous 
cultures, as well as Western anthropologies such as Marcel Mauss’s exploration of a “gift 
economy” that produced nurturing human community rather than tooth and claw competition; 
the humane anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss; the engaged work of Stanley Diamond or 
Michael Taussig; the anarchist anthropology of Peter Kropotkin, Murray Bookchin, or Pierre 
Clastres; or feminist anthropology’s accounts of Neolithic society as constituted by cooperative 
living under matrilineal leadership from Elizabeth Fox Genovese onwards.
17
 Little is said about 
such positive experiences of human endeavor embodied in compassionate and cooperative 
dimensions of sociable community. Indeed, when such efforts are acknowledged (in later 
formations such as millennial religious groups, intentional communities, or secular political 
movements), there is a tendency to regard such progressive actions as collapsing under the 
weight of the repressive power dynamics of group identity, privilege, and consequent control by 
processes of inclusion and exclusion. Given its proffered historical baseline in the experience of 
monstrosity, DANH is imbued by an instrumental pessimism that never throws off the “stench” 
of a one-dimensional dystopian experience and ends up morphing from a declared historical 
examination into an ontological treatise that distances itself from the hopeful project of utopian 
imagination and transformation (4). 
 Turning to the Parts of DANH, while there is much to reflect upon in this nearly 600-page 
study, my primary aim is to examine the book’s overriding perspective, as it reveals a standpoint 
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that tends to privilege controlled social improvement within the present world reality and negates 
communal efforts to break beyond it for a better world for humanity within all of nature (498). 
As noted above, Part I offers a reading of formative experiences of early humans in the natural 
world. Drawing on studies that dwell on the evil tenor of monstrosity, witchcraft, and destructive 
figures from devils to vampires to more contemporary manifestations of madness and perversion, 
DANH claims that human existence has been shaped by a physically and emotionally charged 
encounter informed by the perception that the “natural world is populated by threatening gods, 
monstrous beings, and malevolent spirits” (9). Unfortunately, the book’s account stops at this 
admissible point without considering the many ways that humanity has struggled beyond such 
dire experiences (see 58-109). Thus, ignoring such positive perspectives on human social 
evolution, the text argues that this “original dystopian space in which fear predominates” marks 
“the beginning of the natural history of dystopia” and precedes (and diminishes in anticipation) 
human efforts to conceive of “ideal good spaces of paradise and Heaven” (58, my emphases). It 
is no surprise that the Absolute Subject and Locus of this foundational dystopian reality 
coalesces in the Judeo-Christian figure of Satan and the fiery spaciality of Hell (see especially 
79-93).  
In the portrayal of those who aimed to counter this evil, such as the Christian Church, 
DANH develops its first reflection on the power dynamic that, from prehistory to the present, has 
confronted those who oppose a dystopian reality (and act with a utopian response). Significantly, 
this analysis is grounded in a genealogy of the disciplinary apparatus of group psychology (based 
in the counter-revolutionary theories of Gustav Le Bon down through Sigmund Freud and the 
later Eric Fromm) that operates by way of the divisive mechanism of demonization. Here, 
readers are given much to consider in terms of the destructive dynamics that arise as human fears 
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became “expressed, experienced, and defined by groups” (18). The presentation then turns to the 
work of René Girard to describe how such processes encased community behavior within a 
dystopian frame that appears almost inevitably determined by scapegoating carried out by an 
administrative machinery of control and domination (see 33, 49-50).  
This, then, is the deep structure of psychosocial damage caused by the unmediated 
pairing of the monstrous and the collective that DANH locates at the heart of human endeavor. 
However, in its binary approach, adopting Girard’s account, the book neglects the philosophical 
anthropologist’s further explanation that this destructive creation was, in its emergent 
manifestations in primitive societies, generally a matter of unconscious behavior and not 
necessarily a diabolical manipulation carried out by a controlling group. The text does not go on 
to explore how in Christian and secular contexts this destructive power of scapegoating was, in 
modernity, superseded by redemptive narratives proceeding from the perspective of victims who 
had thrown off such practices by way of liberatory dynamics that refused authoritarian 
domination and opted instead for the co-creation of human possibility (as in the communism of 
the early Christian Church, Anabaptist communitarianism, international socialist and feminist 
solidarity, ecological co-creation politics, or  liberation theology’s “preferential option for the 
poor” and its praxis in Latin American base communities). To be sure, DANH does describe 
efforts to produce a better social reality; but more often than not that description falls back on 
presenting such aspirations as efforts that were able to resist the power politics of “groupism” 
(see, for example, 55-57). As with the argument in “Five Languages,” DANH steps away from a 
consideration of the complexities of the utopian impulse and the resulting transformational 
activity of human communities and misses the opportunity to apply the more positive aspects of 
later versions of group psychology to the constructive process of self-understanding among such 
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communities (nor does it engage with the hope-ful psychology of the human potential 
movement, as elaborated by Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, or Paul Goodman). Indeed, the 
book’s discussion of “secular millenarianism” is indicative of its, perhaps unwilling, pessimistic 
viewpoint. As the text explains, in the supersession of the Christian narrative of millennial well-
being (with its telos of the Kingdom of God transposed into a utopian horizon), the human desire 
for justice and equality encourages “a sense of overwhelming and pervasive injustice and 
corruption” and then reacts by way of an imperative for corrective action; however, given the 
book’s insistence on the power of the monstrous, such efforts, right up to our own moment, are 
doomed to fail because of a group psychology that can only work by way of “suppression” of the 
human stride toward freedom (57). As DANH’s argument leans toward the anti-utopian pole of 
the spectrum of political engagement, the underlying position of the text turns away not only 
from militant empowerment implicit in the psychological traditions mentioned above but also 
other strong explorations of the potential of transformative utopian politics articulated by leaders 
of social justice movements such as Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King Jr., Dorothy Day, Nelson 
Mandela, or Thich Nhat Hanh.
18
  
In Part II, DANH moves from this originary concept of a general dystopian experience to 
an exposition that addresses totalitarianism from Jacobinism, to Nazism, Bolshevism, Stalinism, 
and in China and Cambodia. In a significant departure from its author’s well-regarded earlier 
studies of the emancipatory utopianism of Robert Owen, cooperation, and early socialism, 
DANH draws on Jacob Talmon’s Cold War back-reading of the category of the totalitarian into 
the radical politics of the eighteenth century.
19
 From this antithetical standpoint, the book carries 
its narrative trope of ontological evil and revolutionary groupism into an a-historical 
interpretation that imposes the nomination of totalitarianism onto historical developments (such 
16 
 
as the Inquisition and the French Revolution) that preceded its manifestation in twentieth-century 
fascism and extends its remit to later varieties of authoritarianism that fall outside of the 
conditions of that specific formation, even as it neglects the systemic oppression implicit in the 
totally-administered society produced by capitalism (see especially 114-128).
20
 As the account 
unfolds in the second step of the book’s trajectory, this treatment locks in a conflation of the 
totalitarian with the monstrously dystopian. While there is no question that the terrible systems 
and practices addressed have prompted commentators into the use of the adjective dystopian to 
describe these horrific conditions, DANH advances a universalizing argument by collapsing the 
differences between and among such historically-situated productions and the categorical term, 
thus rendering the “dystopian” character of the dark history of the “totalitarian” in a surface 
depiction that avoids a mediated examination of the differences therein and a consideration of 
ways in which the utopian impulse is always available in the formal operations of the dystopian 
(as opposed to the anti-utopian) mode.  
By the end of this Part, DANH pulls back from a complete equation of the totalitarian and 
the dystopian. Yet, the text preserves that very linkage as it first presents apparent differences 
between the two categories but then demotes them to minor deviations that collapse under the 
weight of the abstract categories of horror and control. In making these distinctions, the 
argument characterizes the general character of totalitarianism (in its “mass cruelty, torture, and 
murder”) in light of what is presented as the “totalizing” function of  “dystopian groups” which 
impose their power by suppressing (purging, cleansing) enemies and rewarding loyal adherents 
(267); it then differentiates the self found in the internal social construction of secular 
millenarianism (in DANH, this ahistorical attribution serves as the generic name for all 
progressive, utopian, organizations) from the externally dominated “totalitarian collective.” Yet, 
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after making this distinction, the text dissolves it by invoking the commonality of “emboldened 
individualism” and “collectivism” as they become the twinned offspring arising from the 
monstrous corruption of human sociality and community (267). Even as a set of historically 
specific differences between internal and external mechanisms of oppression is averred, the 
book’s presentation settles on a universalizing affiliation with the singularity of the dystopian 
and totalitarian.  
Overall then, DANH’s treatment of the longue durée of the production of human evil 
betrays its stated remit as an historical account of the relationship between totalitarianism and the 
dystopian: for this detailed and informative account informs a brief that morally and politically 
diminishes all human efforts at cooperative and collective organizing to build a better society 
(i.e., the progressive utopian project). While the book robustly exposes the concrete horrors of 
Nazism and Stalinism, of the camps and the murders, of the betrayals and the cruelty, it goes on 
to express an all-encompassing ideological, political, and theoretical condemnation of the 
modern original sin of “collectivism.” Even more than secular millenarianism, this ontological 
abstraction becomes an umbrella term for all human solidarity in the modern political sphere, 
ranging from the progressive politics of the eighteenth-century bourgeois Enlightenment through 
to the contemporary Left. While DANH rightly condemns Stalinism, it reaches beyond that 
specificity and pursues its own demonizing project by attaching an a-chronic attribution of the 
ubiquity of abstract dystopian power to all other manifestations of communism, socialism, and 
syndicalism. In an unwelcome reprise of the anti-communism that prevailed in the 1920s and the 
1950s, DANH engages in the very practice of scapegoating that the book itself critiques as it 
devalues revolutionary theory and collective practice that has developed in the progressive 
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tradition from the time of the Enlightenment to the present, thereby ensuring that the 
transformative potential for a radical utopian practice is always already condemned.  
In Part III, DANH addresses the literary dystopia. Following its ontological narrative of 
anthropological monstrosity and sociopolitical terror, the text examines this mode by way of 
surface readings of textual content that resist interventions made possible by historical-
hermeneutic engagements (270).
21
 The main body of this Part features a literary survey that 
locates the origins of dystopian writing in anti-revolutionary “British” satire (thus erasing the 
resistant roots of its Irish provenance as well as ignoring archival research that locates seeds of 
dystopian writing in the hopeful imaginary of the biblical jeremiads, with their admixture of 
warning and anticipation), then moves to the trajectory of the “totalitarian” dystopia (from the 
French Revolution to the end of World War Two), and on to “post-totalitarian” writing from 
1950 to 2015. Between the two periodized sections, the survey offers chapters on two of the most 
significant dystopian works of the twentieth century: Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.  
Before commencing this textual tour, DANH explores the nature and criticism of 
dystopian writing. In a move that, for me, expresses the instrumental logic of this project, this 
section begins by noting the “utility” of the dystopian text, a designation ascribed to Thomas 
More (see 269). Picking up the thematic from Part I, the discussion avers that dystopian writing 
is rooted in the projection of “horrifying or disastrous conditions” and asserts that this literary 
process proceeds by way of nominally realistic portrayals of an imaginary future “where much 
has gone wrong, though sometimes ways out are indicated” (269). Within this broad ascription, 
the text helpfully distinguishes dystopia “proper” from “literatures of natural disaster, 
Apocalypse, and cataclysm” (although, in the light of the current climate crises, there a synergy 
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between dystopia and climate-fiction). However, it then includes “anti-utopias” in its dystopian 
catalogue; in doing so, the text reveals its tendency to link dystopia with anti-utopia and thus to 
minimize dystopia’s critical, indeed utopian, capacity (269, 270).  
Given its initial comments, it is disappointing that DANH misses the opportunity of 
engaging in a more historically and culturally nuanced reading of the formal relationship 
between dystopia and realism/naturalism by ignoring one of the more nuanced assessments of 
this pairing: that is, Phillip E. Wegner’s argument that the modern literary dystopia, which he 
positions as a subgenre of utopia, evolved as a form which functioned as the “negation of the 
negation of both utopia and naturalism” (Wegner, Shockwaves 45).
22
 Drawing on Jameson’s 
observation that late nineteenth-century literary utopias challenged the pessimism of the 
“asphyxiating historical closure of the then reigning literary naturalisms” (generated by a 
confidant empiricism that produced “schematic mappings of an apparently fixed and closed 
social reality” that denied “real possibility of change”), Wegner contends that the modern 
dystopia (e.g., by Jack London, E. M. Forster, or Yevgeny Zamyatin) counters that primary 
opposition with a dialectical sublation of its own, one that “recapitulates and subsumes” elements 
of both “the radical openness of the utopia” and the “closure of naturalism” (Jameson, quoted 
Wegner, Life 118, 117-118, 124).
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 Embedded in the very form of the dystopian narrative is a 
tension that plays out via the category of the political and haunts “dystopian writing throughout 
the twentieth century” (Wegner, Life 119, 124). Looked at through this periodized account of the 
aesthetic and political dynamics of form, specific texts can be examined to assess the degree of 
their negotiation of the competing pulls of the desire for radical change and the denial of “any 
mechanisms or agency by which such change might come about” – with some texts offering 
“emancipatory, militant, open, and ‘critical’” narratives that endorse a radical utopian politics of 
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transformation, and others maintaining a “compensatory, resigned, and quite ‘anti-critical’” anti-
utopian capitulation to and reproduction of the dominant social reality (Wegner, Life 124, 120).
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In choosing not to pursue such a mediated engagement with dystopia as a mode of 
cultural production, DANH holds to a limited version of realism as it reductively declares that the 
primary focus for dystopian literature is its narrative of the dilemma experienced by “rational 
autonomous individuals” lost in the grip of “collectivism.” In the subsection entitled “The 
Literary Dystopia Defined,” the text adds that such works “are understood as primarily 
concerned to portray societies where a substantial majority suffer slavery and/or oppression as a 
result of human action” (269, 290). Regrettably, these suggestive statements are as far as DANH 
goes in defining, or historically specifying, the literary dystopia. Consequently, this 
consideration of dystopia privileges subject matter over form. As the text puts it near the 
beginning of Part III: “Dystopias are not reducible to the history of ideas … But their 
contribution to it, rather than an analysis of the literary forms is our central, though not sole, 
focus here” (273-274). 
DANH then moves into a scholarship survey. Shaping this discussion is a preference for 
empirical accounts: by elimination, the value of critical approaches that encompass formal 
analysis and what the text identifies as “presumed reader contact/response” is minimized on the 
basis of what are characterized as unsubstantiated declarations that “generalize from too narrow 
a textual basis” (290). Nevertheless, the survey ends up delivering its own version of a, non-
dialectical, interpretive and reader response analysis through the book’s social realist approach, 
as it aims for an “objective” assessment. DANH develops this survey by way of summaries that 
too often compress and distort complex arguments, with the review beginning in the 1950s with 
works by Glenn Negley, J. Max Patrick, and George Woodcock as they assess dystopian writing 
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by exploring relations between the literary dystopia and utopia. It is in the 1960s that more 
considered studies emerge: namely, by Arthur O. Lewis, Fred Polak, Chad Walsh (“the first 
major study of the field”), Irving Howe, George Kateb, Mark Hillegas, down to Alexandra 
Aldridge in the late 1970s (275-279). The survey continues into the 1980s with Krishan Kumar’s 
Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (1987), which is praised as “the chief study in the 
period,” symptomatically rewarding Kumar’s conclusion that locates dystopia within the 
category of anti-utopia (279). The review closes with brief accounts of Sargent’s “The Three 
Faces of Utopianism” (1967) and “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited” (1994); J. C. 
Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing, 1516-1700; Tom 
Moylan’s Demand the Impossible (1986) and Scraps of the Untainted Sky (2000); David W. 
Sisk’s Transformations of Language in Modern Dystopia (1997), Erica Gottlieb’s Dystopian 
Fiction East and West (2001), and Artur Blaim’s “Hell upon a Hill: Reflections on Anti-Utopia 
and Dystopia” in Fátima Vieira’s edited volume, Dystopia(n) Matters (2013).  
The review ends with two paragraphs that highlight, but do not resolve, the “considerable 
disagreement over the key terms: dystopia and anti-utopia” and then judges this multiplicity of 
engagements to be unsatisfactory, finding gaps and contradictions throughout (284). It concludes 
that in this work the “concept of dystopia” has generally been approached through three levels of 
interpretation: “authorial intention; reader perception or context by juxtaposition to the author; 
and various types of content or historical narrative” (284). While all three are recognized as part 
of a “nuanced treatment of the tradition” (as advanced in “Five Languages”), this response does 
not pursue an extensive engagement with this body of work but simply declares it to be 
inadequate in the face of the social realist approach. Thus, DANH maintains its empirical-
taxonomic imperative to define, categorize, and summarize dystopia in terms that accord with a 
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binary sense of a social reality that is so overwhelmingly horrendous that the only possible 
attitude for the self-declared rational thinker is that of an equivalent pessimism. Indeed, this 
ultimately nihilistic conclusion is signaled in the subtitle for Part III: “The Literary Revolt 
Against Collectivism”; for in this attribution, DANH paradoxically removes the genre from 
history and reduces the essence of modern dystopian writing to an obsession with the evils of 
collective political agency from early modernity to the present (269).   
DANH moves forward from this review of criticism by continuing its disavowal of 
historical-hermeneutic analyses in a subsection entitled “Science Fiction and Dystopia” (284 ff.). 
Given the book’s reliance on content analysis (and its suspicion of the relevance of sf to utopian 
literary production), the task of coming to terms with the assumed “problem” arising from 
considerations of the relationship between the dystopian and sf modes proves to be a challenge 
impossible to meet, resulting in a discussion that is, to me, sketchy and indecisive (284). 
Reverting to the old debate on the appropriateness of seeing “dystopian literature as a branch of 
science fiction,” DANH resists a dialectical engagement that could have considered the intricate 
historical and formal contingencies that a wide variety of critics have explored for decades. 
While the text rejects Darko Suvin’s argument that utopia is the “‘socio-political subgenre’ of 
science fiction,” it does not engage with the further debate regarding this attribution between 
Suvin and China Miéville, much less with analyses of form and politics undertaken by Jameson, 
Suvin, Baccolini, Wegner, Mark Bould, Sherryl Vint, Caroline Edwards, and others: thereby 
developing its approach in such a way that resignedly collapses the two generic modes to no 
useful end. To offer one example: in not addressing Baccolini’s examination of the practice of 
“genre blurring” as it plays out in the formal operations of utopian and dystopian writing 
(especially in the critical utopia and critical dystopia), the book again stops short of an 
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interpretive analysis that could have deepened its consideration of dystopia and sf as it looked 
beyond the dated obsession with the their opposition to or absorption of each other.
25
  
Indeed, in reference to this formal relationship, and significantly at its meta-theoretical 
register, Baccolini’s discussion of genre blurring is pertinent to my examination of the gaps and 
silences in DANH’s overall treatment. As she explains it, one of the key literary changes that 
“opens up [critical dystopian] texts is an intensification of the practice of genre blurring. By self-
reflexively borrowing specific conventions from other genres, critical dystopias more often blur 
the received boundaries of the dystopian form and thereby expand its creative potential for 
critical expression” (Baccolini 7). Like Wegner, she exemplifies another way in which formal 
analysis not only elucidates the historically contingent nature of generic changes but also their 
social and cultural impact. Further, she stresses deeper consequences of her theoretical 
intervention: “Drawing on the feminist criticism of universalist assumptions – fixity and 
singularity, and neutral and objective knowledge – and recognizing the importance of difference, 
multiplicity, and complexity, of partial and situated knowledges, as well as of hybridity and 
fluidity, the critical dystopias resist genre purity in favor of an impure or hypertext that renovates 
dystopian sf by making it formally and politically oppositional” (Baccolini 7). In the context of 
this essay, Baccolini’s methodological contribution arising from the interconnection of critical 
dystopian studies and feminist criticism expresses a perspective that DANH ignores in its 
preference for social realism’s unmediated universalist claims based in a presumed objective 
knowledge.  
In the end, DANH’s focus on the relationship between dystopia and sf is distracted by 
minor cavils and is unproductive. Yet, as a subtext of this section, a demonization of interpretive 
utopian studies continues, proceeding not by way of dialogic critique but by neglect. However, in 
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considering DANH overall, I can understand why its empiricism might be cloistered from such 
interventions. For, in all its variations, this critical constellation generally proceeds from an 
identification of utopia (and dystopia) in rigorous studies that enable sociopolitical 
interpretations of formal productions within a historical period (including the consideration of 
authorial intention, which DANH incorrectly claims such work neglects). In this regard, the book 
misses the opportunity to think dialectically: to interpret social reality as a systemic totality 
which can be analytically approached in its entirety from any of its parts.  
Part III concludes with useful plot summaries of 150 dystopias published since 2003 (the 
most pertinent being those addressing climate change). In the thematic synopsis of this section, 
the text suggests that there has been a shift in dystopian content away from a “concentration on 
political collectivism to that of the impact of technology, population growth, and environmental 
degradation,” wherein narratives featuring nuclear war and authoritarian states have folded into 
accounts of a more diffused “plutocratic dystopia” (488, 489). However, it then declares that two 
attributes of this dystopian output have diminished the genre’s capacity to confront our 
troublesome social reality. First, the argument avers that there is a greater tendency for recent 
dystopian writing to be written within a science fictional imaginary, and thus to be generating 
narratives that indulge in entertaining distractions of estranged locations, off-world or in the 
future, rather than soberly focusing on what are regarded as more pressing realistic portrayals. 
Second, following from this, the argument evades a consideration of the ways in which this 
formal capacity for cognitive estrangement can lead to a critical/transformative response to 
current conditions. Again upholding the worthiness of social realism, DANH implies that 
“escapist” narratives fail to confront the harshness of reality – thereby missing the long-standing 
observation in sf reader response criticism that the figurative work of such texts is capable of 
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stimulating a cultural and political break from the contemporary world that is highly productive 
of radical change. Taking this account further, DANH reveals its pessimistic position as it argues 
against what is described as the tendency of recent dystopian novels to be “overly zealous in 
their insisting on the necessity for happy endings, imagining deviant rebels who beat the system, 
implausibly rescuing their central characters, and providing ‘hope’ in the persistence of utopian 
enclaves”: thus delivering an inopportune underestimation of many dystopian outcomes – 
especially critical dystopian thought experiments exploring utopian enclaves and offering open 
endings to be resolved by readers – and missing the political impact that formal innovations can 
produce in readers (489, my emphasis). 
DANH implies that this braided dynamic of formal estrangement and political hope 
diminishes the “political content of many later novels,” even as it paradoxically grants that, at the 
level of entertainment, they encourage their flourishing as “a richer literary genre” (489). While 
on one level, these remarks accord with my own argument that the currently popular dystopian 
structure of feeling tends to foster passive resignation rather than stimulate engagement (as in the 
sense of the diminution of the “political” as linked to an increased interest in commodified 
entertainment), I suggest that by not engaging with the politics and pleasures emanating from the 
formal maneuvers of recent dystopian sf (and here it’s time to accept that the two genres are 
indeed tightly imbricated), this important study is, for all its good intentions, complicit with that 
resigned attitude as it refuses the opportunity to carry out a critically interpretive analysis of 
these texts (considered in their authorial and historical specificities). Thus DANH fails to 
recognize that political consciousness and struggle are traceable along the continuum between 
utopia and anti-utopia that is at the core of the dystopian form. To be sure, while our current 
moment is not solely an era of totalitarian states and nuclear bombs, it is a time when those still 
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present dangers are entangled in capitalist and environmental crises that permeate our individual 
and collective lives as well as every corner of the planet more effectively than those perpetrated 
by state power alone. In this situation, as Singh notes, the multi-dimensional narratives required 
to break through this structure of tightly-sutured personal and systemic docility must be both 
engaged and entertaining works that can capture readerly affect and speak to the crises of their 
time.  
I therefore question DANH’s observation that the “most marked discontinuity in the 
development of the genre is a relative disengagement with everyday politics which characterized 
so many later nineteenth-century century texts,” and I query its aversion to considering the 
validity of hope as a driving force in humanity’s struggle to survive the current crises and thrive 
beyond them (494).
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 By holding to a narrow understanding of the “political” as found in 
classical dystopian narrative and discounting the potential of dystopian sf figurations that do not 
deflect from but rather enhance their capacity for warning and education, this substantial work 
nevertheless short-circuits a critical response that could make an intellectual and creative 
contribution to the movements around the globe struggling to oppose that culture of despair and 
resignation. Rather than exploring actually existing utopian elements (latent or available) within 
the dystopian mode (benighted as it currently is), DANH ends up valorizing a sociopolitical 
standpoint restricted to the provincial present.  
Within this framework, the book unsurprisingly embraces the technocratic subgenre of 
futurology as a way to make its point that readers, and citizens, need to stop indulging in 
fantasies and soberly face the present global horrors in order to blow away the prevailing miasma 
of dystopian resignation (see 499, and 286, 459, 488). However, even as it underscores the 
usefulness of futurological extrapolations (expressing pragmatic possibilities rather than 
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anticipations of alternative realities), the text creates little room for a radical and redemptive 
political impulse and agency that can demand the “impossible” (as defined within the present 
moment) and catalyze a transformative breakthrough. Instead, these comments resonate with an 
evangelical, almost Calvinist, sense of a predetermined, absolute “end time” rather than an open-
ended, yes utopian, millenarian or antinomian anticipation of apocalyptic stages (see 499-500). 
Caught in this cul-de-sac, DANH misses out on the bright potential for an apocalyptic and 
utopian hope that “stays with the trouble” (as Donna Haraway puts it; and as Margaret Atwood, 
Kim Stanley Robinson, and others explore in recent sf thought experiments) and thereby hails 
the de-sutured, anti-normative, “bad,” subjects needed to work through and against the hard 
times to create a better world.
27
 By dismissing the subversive potential of dystopian texts that 
explore movements and enclaves of resistance within their pages or that challenge readers, in a 
Brechtian manner, to carry on radical speculation after closing the cover, the book maintains a 
politically limited valorization of an apparently realistic confrontation that (by rejecting the 
strong thought enabled by the anticipation of a concrete utopian alternative) leaves it with the 
weak declaration that “pessimism has its place” (501).
28
  
Overall then, this monograph, however unintended, contributes to the current hegemonic 
culture of resignation. Despite its immense amount of material presented as “natural history,” 
DANH is shaped by a narrative that begins with a primal scene/sin based in monstrosity, moves 
through a plot in which totalitarian control and collectivism erase political potential for 
transformation, and ends with a literary coda that reaffirms a dark dénouement that evacuates the 
capability for a collective cultural and political action and asserts the need for authoritative 
knowledge and control from a singularly privileged position. Darkly, the universally monstrous 
runs along the spine of this sweeping commentary and infuses it with such a reinforcement of the 
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predominance of evil that no alternative (no utopia) can grow from the methodology or negative 
idealism of this study. Indeed, the closing lines of the book offer the most revealing statement of 
its intention (again framed within a preference for absolute binaries and the security of a social 
realism which in the end is neither sufficiently social nor realist):  
the task of the literary dystopia, then, is to warn against and educate us about real-life 
dystopias. It need not furnish a happy ending to do so: pessimism has its place. But it 
may envision rational and collective solutions where irrationality and panic loom. 
Entertainment plays a role in this process. But the task at hand is serious. It gains daily in 
importance. Here, then, is a genre, and the concept, whose time has come. May it 
flourish. (501, my emphasis).  
With due respect for DANH’s legitimate concern about the fate of the present world, I fear that 
this call for a rigorous response to our “real-life” crises (even with its surprising inclusion of 
collective actions) will not find sufficient political traction arising from such a, paradoxically 
hopeful, prayer for the flourishing of an effective dystopian realism; for its insistent pessimism 
plays into the ruling logic of capitalist “realism” (however much the author may oppose it) and 
inhibits the generation of actual next steps that could be taken to achieve a radically other, 
radically better society. By virtue of this resistance to the dystopian imagination’s prophetic 
capacity to engage the potential of a wide-ranging, especially collective, utopian agency, 
DANH’s sustained cathexis to the recurring force of the monstrous and the complementary need 
for authoritative restraint and rule leaves readers not only with the sobering conclusion that 
humanity has gotten it all wrong from the beginning of time but also that they cannot now 
endeavor to set it right (because compassionate and cooperative struggle by human groups and 
movements is regarded as doomed to failure through immersion within an atmosphere of 
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irrationality, panic, and impotence). Consequently, excesses represented by categories such as 
“hope” or “happy endings” must be contained, lest even more evil enters into the world.  
Therefore, DANH presents more as a work of political theology than intellectual or 
cultural history, as it affirms an ontological and methodological standpoint that prompts despair 
rather than hope, leaches the utopian potential from dystopia, and consequently disarms utopia 
by depriving it of its transformative potential. Resonant with the religious discourse of Carl 
Schmitt, the book evokes a pre-modern sense of the biblical trope of the katechon (the 
authoritative “bulwark” that restrains the evil of the Antichrist) in its contrapuntal assertion of 
the necessity of a social utopia whose restrained rule will counter the evils of human behavior in 
a “realistic” manner that avoids the open-ended dynamism of a collective and transformative 
utopian project.
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 This validation of Cold War “containment” (rooted in thinkers such as Hobbes, 
Le Bon, Talmon, and Schmitt) of the undisciplined and diverse forces of the utopian impulse 
(and indeed of a great deal of the output of utopian studies) is in direct opposition to post-World 
War II progressive theology informed by Bloch’s Marxist hermeneutics and the French Marxist-
Christian dialogue; developed by the likes of Paul Tillich, Moltmann, and Gutiérrez; and carried 
forth in practices of the Second Vatican Council as well as progressive Protestantism and 
Judaism. There is little room in DANH for what Bloch would term a “warm stream” of utopian 
interpretation and politics; yet, there is a “cold stream” of a pessimistic apprehension and control 
of the world. While the book sincerely seeks a minimalist utopianism in the face of dystopian 
reality, it disappointingly delivers less than it promises; for its proffered alternative is not strong 
enough, not radical enough, to overcome the current order of things and support the next steps 
toward a utopian alternative. Consequently, we, readers and citizens, are left hope-less in the face 
of its general aversion to the totalizing, transgressive, and transformative substance of a radical 
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utopianism. In the end, Dystopia: A Natural History, for all its rigor and passion, stands less as a 
volume of utopian (or dystopian) historical discourse but rather as an ontologically-infused work 
that falls under the shadow of contemporary anti-utopianism.  
III. 
 Fortunately, the resigned pessimism evinced by DANH is superseded by others who 
continue to enlist the potential of radical utopian hope in these dark times. While many are 
taking up this challenge (rethinking “interpretation,” as Berardi puts it, or “hope” as Solnit and 
Ahmed term it), Kim Stanley Robinson, as a public intellectual and author, has been particularly 
strong in his sociopolitical and ecological interventions (Berardi 234-236). In his fiction, essays, 
and lectures, Robinson addresses the dystopian conditions of our world. Yet, he always 
challenges them through a utopian lens, looking toward a utopian horizon. In work after work, he 
creates paths through the trouble that open toward a renewed world not simply imbued by justice 
and healing, but one in which humans as an active part of nature can find redeemed fulfillment. 
And so to offer one counterpoint to the current resigned ambience of dystopian modes, and to 
studies such as DANH, I want to turn to Robinson’s 2018 essay (in the appropriately titled 
Commune), “Dystopias Now.” If Lepore’s article identifies the problem of a compliant dystopian 
structure of feeling, and if DANH’s intervention negates the utopian possibility of breaking apart 
that dystopian enclosure, Robinson’s short article offers a negation of that negation, as he 
articulates an anti-anti-utopian stance that revives the utopian project.  
In this piece that fuses the journalistic and the theoretical, Robinson keeps the categories 
of dystopia and utopia in proximate relation to each other. Like Lepore, he expresses his concern 
about the capture of a dystopian structure of feeling by neoliberal capitalism; and so, like 
Berardi, he characterizes the current surge of dystopias as offering an experience of regressive 
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comparison that is “fashionable, perhaps lazy, maybe even complacent, because one pleasure of 
reading them is cozying into the feeling that however bad our present moment is, it’s nowhere 
near as bad as the ones these poor characters are suffering through” (online). Thus, contemporary 
reception, and the culture within which it occurs, appears as a form of “indulgence” that creates 
“a sense of comparative safety” leading to a “kind of late-capitalist, advanced-nation 
schadenfreude about those unfortunate fictional citizens whose lives have been thrashed by our 
own political inaction” (online). If this is so, then “dystopia is part of our all-encompassing 
hopelessness” (online). At best, the utopian enclaves found in recent works end up being safe 
spaces reserved for the privileged rather than liberated zones fostering total transformation for 
all: thus, such narratives become “reactionary statements on the behalf of the currently powerful, 
those who enjoy a poorly-hidden utopia-for-the few alongside a dystopia-for the-many” (online).  
However sobering Robinson’s assessment – and however much it partially resonates with 
the discussion in DANH on the limits of “entertainment” fiction – this utopian intellectual is not 
prepared to accept the toxicity of such resigned pleasures and instead calls for a refunctioned 
utopianism. In aid of this, he invokes the formal potential of utopian/dystopian sf for engaging 
with the current situation in a way that tears through its sutured reality and opens to a better 
world for humanity and nature. In an insightful exploration of the formal mechanisms of this 
estranged genre, Robinson’s describes how sf’s “double action” elucidates critical engagement: 
on one hand, sf portrays “some future that might actually come to pass” in a “proleptic” (rather 
than “social”) realism that anchors the author’s critical assessment within a delineated 
apprehension of our current social reality; on the other, it “presents a metaphorical vision of our 
current moment” that disengages our perceptions from the equally metaphorical surface 
“realism” that reinforces our immersion in “things as they are” (online). This double helix of sf’s 
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“aesthetic machinery” offers an encounter with history and politics that can carry us into a future 
that could be but is Not Yet. Breaking with the compliant pessimism of the current structure of 
feeling, and transcending the confines of capitalist, or indeed social, realism, Robinson 
recaptures what he sees as the potential of the “real feeling expressed” in dystopian writing 
(online). Such an affective stimulation takes on sociopolitical effectivity as it is freed from the 
limited perspective of the present. Thus, suffering and destruction, and hope, can open the way 
for radical new possibilities. Or, as he invokes the powerful capacity of sf figuration: “since 
nothing seems to work now, why not blow things up and start over? This would imply that 
dystopia is some kind of call for revolutionary change. There may be something to that” (online). 
Robinson sums up this contemporary challenge in the subhead to his article: “The end of the 
world is over. Now the real work begins” (online). Therefore, the question of political 
responsibility and activism becomes central in this dystopian moment. Like Haraway, he grants 
that things may well be bad, and yet it is also the case that we humans “are responsible for 
making them get worse” and equally responsible for engaging in “[c]ollective political action … 
in order to make things better” (online). Unlike the position put forward in DANH, he embraces 
the collective. Indeed, he asserts that “personal virtue or renunciation” will not be sufficient and 
embraces unified action (online).  
Consequently, Robinson identifies the general agenda within the hegemonic social 
system to expose the collective to the inquisition of an anti-utopian ideology and practice. In 
response, he argues for becoming anti-anti-utopian: as he states, “[i]t’s crucial to keep imagining 
that things could get better, and furthermore to imagine how they might get better” (online). This 
is the “irrealistic  realism” (itself productively escapist) informed by a hopeful human desire for 
a fulfilled happiness that is denied within DANH’s paradoxical combination of social realism and 
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speculative ontology; but, I would argue, it is precisely the approach needed in these times.
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Despite fears, despite doubts, we humans need to act. We need to engage in a utopian practice 
that breaks through the assumed implacability of the present moment. As Robinson puts it: “we 
have to do this work no matter how we feel about it. So by force of will or the sheer default of 
emergency we make ourselves have utopian thoughts and ideas” (online). In this way, he 
succinctly captures the necessity of negating the prevailing dystopian structure of feeling: “This 
is the necessary next step following the dystopian moment, without which dystopia is stuck at a 
level of political quietism that can make it just another tool of control and of things-as-they-are” 
(online).  
Thus, Robinson refuses the limits of the provincial present. He disavows the ideological 
formation reinforced by works such as DANH; and in his own creative and critical work he aims 
to tear down the containment field entrapping critics and citizens, readers and activists, within 
the “seemingly omnipresent reality principle” that informs “the fashionable pessimism, or simply 
cynicism” of our present era (online). Rather than the weak anti-utopian thought shaped by 
DANH’s social realism, with its wish that dystopian critique may “flourish,” Robinson exercises 
the utopian strong thought of not only opposing the present but boldly articulating better ways as 
they unfold in an ever-evolving historical reality. The de-alienating process of imagining, and 
working toward, a horizon of a “sustainable civilization” can be made possible by a regenerated 
dystopian encounter that is again militantly hopeful (online). As he puts it in his concluding 
lines: “if dystopia helps to scare us into working harder on that project, which maybe it does, 
then fine: dystopia” (online). As opposed to DANH’s immersion in an undercurrent of 
monstrosity, Robinson asserts that dystopian disturbance must be “always in the service to the 




 As I argue in Scraps of the Untainted Sky, “the dystopian genre has always worked with a 
contested continuum between utopian and anti-utopian positions: between texts that are 
emancipatory, militant, and ‘critical’ and those that are compensatory, resigned, and quite ‘anti-
critical’” (Moylan, Scraps 188).
31
 As Wegner points out, the primary subject in play along this 
continuum is the potential for “politics itself – of agency and of a kickstarting of the engine of 
history in a moment when it seems to many to be terminally stalled” (Wegner, Life 119). 
Whether encouraged by utopian energy or suppressed by anti-utopian authority, the political is 
the core element carried within a dystopian narrative as it enables either a militant optimism or a 
resigned pessimism. In this regard, all dystopias confront society’s terrible conditions; however, 
the direction that confrontation takes (as engagement/transformation or 
resignation/compensation) is the crucial factor that enables us not to prescribe a singular 
philosophical or political line but rather diagnostically to “locate the horizon of political 
contestation in any present” (Wegner, Life 120).  
 In this perspective, dystopia is not reducible to the empirical status of a natural object nor 
to an ontological affiliation with monstrosity or evil; nor is it a guaranteed platform for a utopian 
assertion. Rather, dystopia (as interpretive problematic and formal creation) can produce a 
sociopolitical evaluation and contestation with an enclosing and dominant system. It therefore 
offers an agential opportunity for a utopian process of denunciation and annunciation.
32
 
However, the means by which this utopian impulse is given flesh in any dystopian narrative, 
even within the current “dystopian” cultural milieu, is a matter for creative and interpretive 
intervention in each contingent case. The refunctioning of the utopian project is never a matter of 
absolute declaration, wishful thought, or complicit abandon. What Wegner calls the “instability” 
35 
 
of the dystopian imbues it with an energy (however it emerges in a given situation) that can 
(re)ignite the utopian flame (Wegner, Life 120). It is this creative and politically charged, 
unstable, unfixable, ever present yet ever evolving, condition that ensures the enduring use value 
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